The ability to rapidly sequence, map, and interpret genomes has revolutionised biomedical research. Today, a scientist working anywhere in the world with a computer and an internet connection can log on to vast gene databases to study tens of millions of gene sequences from more than 130 000 species, together with the complete genome sequences of more than 1000 viruses and bacteria and a growing number of plants, fungi, and animals-including human beings. In addition to raw gene data, it is possible to find on the internet detailed genomic analyses that identify key genes and predict such things as the aminoacid sequences and functions of the proteins for which these genes code. The wealth of material and the ease with which it can be found, probed, and analysed is astounding.
Equally remarkable is the fact that most of these data are available to everyone for free. Indeed, it is the official policy of the largest genome-sequence data repositories, such as the European Bioinformatics Institute, the DNA Data Bank of Japan, and the US National Center for Biotechnology Information, that access to these data should be free, unfettered, and anonymous. The many other not-for-profit organisations that maintain large genome databases, such as the Sanger Institute and the Institute for Genomic Research, have the same policy.
But while free and open access to these data is a boon to science, it carries some risk: among the genome sequences freely available on the internet are those for more than 100 pathogens, including the organisms that cause anthrax, botulism, smallpox, Ebola haemorrhagic fever, and plague. It is possible that a government, a terrorist organisation, or even an individual could use data from these repositories to create novel pathogens that could be used as weapons.
Concerned about this possibility, several US agencies, including the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Central Intelligence Agency, commissioned the National Academies of Science, an independent organisation established by Congress to advise the government on technical issues, to convene a scientific panel to evaluate the risk and recommend policies to govern access to such data. On Sept 9, the panel released its report Seeking security: pathogens, open access, and genome databases.
The panel concluded, rightly, that current policies should remain unchanged: "Rapid, unrestricted public access to primary genome sequence data, annotations of genome data, genome databases, and internetbased tools for genome analysis should be encouraged." In arriving at that conclusion the panel relied largely on practical considerations. For example. the panel found it hard to tell what data should be restricted. Access to the genome for Bacillus anthracis could be limited to only authorised researchers, but bioweapons investigators could work out a great deal by studying the genome of the soil bacteria B cereus or B thuringiensis, which is widely used as a microbial insecticide, or even unrelated organisms. Arguably, sequences in the human genome important to the immune response to infection might also have to be restricted because they could be used by a bioweapons researcher to create a pathogen able to evade the human immune response.
The panel noted that the threat of misuse is not as great as some might fear. Although genome sequences might suggest ways to develop a more deadly pathogen, creating a virulent, robust organism that could be used as a bioweapon would still be a demanding technological challenge. "Although access to whole-organism genome sequences has become vital to life-science research, the data do not immediately provide understanding of any organism's natural properties, nor do they furnish a road map for manipulating the organism to give it new properties", the panel said.
But even if sequences were identified as being particularly dangerous, the panel noted that it would be "difficult, expensive, and probably counterproductive" to try to restrict access to these data. As the music and film industries have learned, digital files are easily copied and shared. There is a good chance that restricted data on a US or European server, for example, could be found and copied from a server in another country. Despite restrictions, it is likely that anyone determined to obtain a particular genome sequence would be able to do so. And, of course, the genomes of some of the most worrying pathogens have already been posted on the internet and are beyond recall. Stringent restrictions thus would impede the work of legitimate researchers but would likely fail to deny access to those who wish to use the data to make weapons.
The current system also offers tremendous benefits. The panel pointed to the recent experience with severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) as an example of the power of an open system. In March, 2003, WHO issued a global health alert about an atypical pneumonia in Vietnam, Hong Kong, and Guangdong Province in China. Within 6 weeks, the SARS coronavirus had been isolated and cultured, and its genome sequenced and posted on the internet. These data, freely available to all, allowed scientists around the world to begin studying this virus and its pathogenicity, led to the development of vaccine candidates and diagnostic tests, and helped guide the antiviral drug research. "Unfettered, free access to the results of life-science research . . . has served science and society well", the panel argues, accelerating research and speeding the "life-saving benefits" of that research.
But beyond the practical, open-access policies of the genome database repositories serve another purpose. One that might, in the long run, be more important. They present the world with a model of international cooperation, trust, and altruism that offers a compelling alternative to the worldview of those who would use bioweapons to impose their political and ideological views. s The Lancet 2 weeks ago, an Advisory Committee to the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) rejected an application for ximelagatran, AstraZeneca's new thrombin inhibitor. The Committee cited worries about liver toxicity, which has led to three deaths, together with doubts about the company's plans to monitor and manage liver complications.
No one doubts that an alternative to the hard to use, and consequently underused, warfarin is needed. Ximelagatran was to be indicated to prevent venous thomboembolism, especially after total knee replacement, and to prevent strokes in patients with atrial fibrillation.
Ximelagatran has stumbled at this regulatory hurdle, for the moment at least; the company is urgently negotiating with the FDA. Does this failure for another hoped-for blockbuster drug reflect a greater malaise in the pharmaceutical industry and auger badly for the future? Quite probably, yes. The age of the blockbuster drug seems over, or at least in its last days.
The problem is that the pharmaceutical industry has not been as innovative as it claims to be, a failing reflected in the falling stock-market performance of many large companies. Most of the big pharmaceutical manufacturers spend more on marketing than on research and development. In last-ditch flings at seeking new markets, the drugs industry can only come up with new indications for old drugs and metoo compounds to barge into existing markets.
What has gone so wrong? Are all the known drug receptors saturated with existing compounds, as it were, such that no new drugs are needed? Certainly not, since current treatments are not effective enough, and safety profiles could well be improved. Drug companies actively research for new ways to interact with known receptors and seek out new receptors. But the development road is long, stony, and expensive, as seen with ximelagatran.
The traditional route to drug discovery, the old pharmacology of testing analogues of active drugs or the slightly newer pharmacology of mass screenings in chemical libraries, is not yet over. But neither has rational drug design-the new pharmacology of characterising the receptor and making a drug to fitcome up with a blockbuster, although it may do one day. Such rational research has led to licensed drugs, but they are mostly for rare diseases (eg, imatinib for gastrointestinal stromal tumours) or are barely effective, even in combination with traditional therapies (eg, trastuzumab for some advanced breast cancers).
The challenge is set for drug companies to become truly innovative. A good start would be to forget the me-too market (after compounds three and four are licensed) and to go and find those receptors, old and new, and the genuinely new compounds to interact with them. s The Lancet Is that it, then, for blockbuster drugs?
